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esistono viventi che non raggiungono mai la maturità di una persona, 
peraltro sempre precaria ed esposta a ogni possibile illusione. esistono 
individui umani che pensano d’essere persone e magari si sbagliano. ne 
esistono altri che non vogliono diventarlo, non intendono crescere; altri 
ancora, che non hanno la possibilità di farlo come vorrebbero, che non 
possono formarsi perché non godono di determinati diritti e beni, e tra 
i beni, nemmeno di quelli comuni, perché non possono respirare e sono 
costretti a vivere in spazi ristretti, in condizioni disagiate dal punto di 
vista economico-materiale e assiologico.1
Through luminous phrases like these, roberta guccinelli2 - author of 
the long process of re-translation of the masterpiece of max scheler, il 
formalismo nell’etica e l’etica materiale dei valori3 (formalism in ethics and non-
formal ethics of Values)  - captures, in her introductory essay to the great work 
of phenomenological ethics published in two parts (1913, 1916) in Husserl’s 
Jahrbuch, one of the most valuable core of the text: the phenomenological 
perspective on personal identity. formalism is in fact a monumental attempt 
to think the person in her relationship with the universe of values , an 
attempt to think how the person becomes or does not become herself 
through encounters and clashes with the demands posed by reality: reacting 
to the positive or negative qualities of the things, taking position for or 
against certain axiological situations, accepting or rejecting experiences, 
encounters, relationships.
in this fundamental but not well known book, scheler explores some issues 
previously discussed in his works, such as the problem of the relationship 
between knowledge and the forms of culture, and also refers to issues 
that he will develop in his later works, like the problem of intersubjective 
knowledge, which is today one of the main issues of the research on social 
1 r. guccinelli, introductory essay to m. scheler, il formalismo nell’etica e l’etica materiale dei 
valori, edited by R. Guccinelli, Bompiani, Milano 2013, p. XXIX.
2 Roberta Guccinelli (Lucca 1969) received her PhD in Philosophy at the University of Geneva 
and she has taught and researched at the university of geneva and the university Vita-salute san 
raffaele in milan. Translator of a. Pfänder and J. hersch, she published, among others, la forma 
del fare. estetica e ontologia in Jeanne hersch, Bruno Mondadori, Milan 2007.
3  The new translation also presents the original text, taken from the last german edition: 
max scheler, der formalismus in der ethik und die materiale Wertethik. neuer Versuch der grundlegung 
eines ethischen Personalismus (19273), mit einem anhang von maria scheler, gesammelte Werke, Bd. 
II., Studienausgabe, 8. Aufl., Nach der 7. durchges. U. verb. Aufl. 2000, hrsg. v. M. Frings, Bouvier 
Verlag, Bonn 2009.
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cognition. formalism is a research full of original ideas and insights that 
leads the reader directly to the heart of the phenomenological ethics: 
husserl and scheler have both created a theoretical proposal that reject the 
main directions of modern ethics: Utilitarian Consequentialism (Empirism) 
and Kantian deontologism. at the centre of the phenomenological 
attempts of these authors to re-establish the practical thinking there are 
value judgment and axiological experience, conceived as an experience 
of reality. formalism is perhaps the most important and systematic work 
that deepens this kind of approach, which has always been a marginal 
approach in the history of moral philosophy. But the importance of scheler’s 
masterpiece is not just limited to the role that it plays in the history of 
the phenomenological movement: formalism is a work of great relevance 
for the contemporary debate, and the same goes for many other author’s 
works. Born from a very dynamic reflection, sensitive to the urgent needs 
of his time, Scheler’s work take us back to the first twenty years of the past 
century in Germany − 10s and 20s. Those years were a kind of laboratory 
of the most innovative trends in contemporary philosophical thought. 
By going back to that time we can discover ‘seeds of thought’, auroral 
philosophical directions that are particularly fruitful and interesting for 
the contemporary debate. This happens with The nature of Sympathy and 
also with formalism. Today analytic philosophy interacts closely with the 
most rigorous phenomenological works, especially in the new research in 
Philosophy of mind, cognitive science, social ontology and social cognition 
(and scheler is precisely one of the author most widely used for this 
dialogue4), as if the phenomenology places itself as a field of recomposition 
of the historic separation between analytic and continental philosophy.
We can define formalism, as roberta guccinelli does, as a huge and inspiring 
“libro dell’esperienza”, a handbook on our moral experience: on the richness 
of value qualities and the ways to feel or not to feel them (the ways of ‘affective 
cognition’). it’s a work that places the individual at the centre of its investigation 
without trapping him in a fixed, rigid, monolithic system: the perspective of 
formalism takes care of all the fragility, the ‘holes’, the gaps of existence, which is 
always in danger of failing, of losing reality. according to scheler, the process to 
become a person is an uncertain, delicate, unpredictable process.
4  cfr. s. gallagher, d.Zahavi, The Phenomenological mind: an introduction to Philosophy of mind and 
Cognitive Science, Routledge 2008.
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formalism had already been translated in italian but it needed a new 
translation. Why? Because the previous translation5 was almost unusable: it 
didn’t take enough care of the specificity of the phenomenological language 
and therefore it couldn’t ‘sink’ into the deep meaning of scheler’s theses, 
enclosing them in categories taken from other sources or misunderstanding 
some aspects of the analysis due to a lack of phenomenological sensitivity. 
caronello’s choices favored comprehension errors, unclear interpretation, 
burdening the reading.
The new  translation by guccinelli brings to completion a long and precious 
series of new italian translations of some of the most important max 
scheler’s works6: in recent years, indeed, the philosophical community has 
rediscovered the importance of his works on ethics, in which he reflects on 
practical reason in an alternative way to that of immanuel Kant. formalism 
is in fact the only systematic attempt of a rational foundation of practical 
reason, which tries to save − contrary to what Kant does − the profile of our 
authentic experience. These new italian translations or re-translations, 
mostly done by experts in phenomenology, have the intention to bring to 
light the specific style of argumentation, analysis and phenomenological 
definition of the author. All these new translations try to be more faithful 
to the words, to the language of phenomenology, which is rich in semantic 
differentiations and stratifications, not simple but extremely rigorous, 
characterized by a “passion for the differences”, for distinction between 
different kind of phenomena, a philosophical approach that today − not by 
chance – can discuss with contemporary analytic thinking, still dealing 
with the main issues of our lives (emotions, values, community life, and 
social justice).
roberta guccinelli’s translation was really necessary to free scheler’s german 
from the ideological or religious interferences, which have little to do with 
his theses, a need that has not yet been fulfilled, instead, in the case of Italian 
translations of edith stein’s works, which still remain mostly excluded from 
the research of the scientific community, because the language she used is not 
updated with current phenomenological standards and the periods are often 
deprived of the original meaning. guccinelli’s work on formalism resembles a 
5  m. scheler, il formalismo nell’etica e l’etica materiale dei valori, edited by g. caronello, san Paolo, 
Cinisello Balsamo 1996.
6  For example: M. Scheler (1913, 1923), Wesen und formen der Sympathie; now in gw Vii, 
pp. 9-259, italian edition: essenza e forme della simpatia, edited by l. Boella, tr. by l. oliva and 
S. Soannini, Franco Angeli, Milano 2010; (1911-19) Vorbilder und führer, in gw X, pp. 255-319, 
italian edition: Modelli e capi. Per un personalismo etico in sociologia e filosofia della storia, edited by 
E. Caminada, with an introductory essay by G. Cusinato; Franco Angeli, Milano 2011; (1921) Vom 
ewigen im menschen, in gw V, italian edition: l’eterno nell’uomo, edited by P. Premoli de marchi, 
Bompiani, Milano 2009.
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sort of epochè on the text, that preserve the original phenomenological spirit 
of scheler’s pages, the taste for the precise description, for the vividness of 
intuition, the passion for the word that ‘says the thing’, remaining within 
the limits of the thing itself. The aim of this new Bompiani translation 
is to follow the development of the rigorous analysis with philosophical 
and phenomenological expertise, through the volcanic and charming 
Scheler’s writing, through his exemplifications and tireless interdisciplinary 
attitude. max scheler was indeed an intellectual of broad interests, not only 
philosophical but also scientific, historical, sociological, anthropological and 
literary. it’s not simply to deal with formalism: it has not been written in a 
unified manner, it is extremely rich in digressions and theoretical insights 
(sometimes not fully developed), a sort of ‘yard book’, the result of a special 
mind, able to embrace the reality in its abundance of aspects, with its many 
points of contrast, always picking up essential nature of the phenomena. it 
is challenging to deal with this book and its language because of the living 
tension between the dedication to the ‘world-of-life’ multiplicity and its 
systematic intent, which is a typical feature of the phenomenological attitude.
for a long time in the italian philosophical context scheler’s thought has 
been received separated from the phenomenological method and read with 
inappropriate categories, often catholic categories: but scheler attended the 
german catholic circles only a few years and in any case this does not justify 
distortions and misrepresentations of his ideas. italian scholars have often 
confined Scheler within the boundaries of Catholic traditions, hiding all the 
genuine potential of a very lively and original thought, full of interesting ideas 
for the contemporary debate. in formalism, but also in his other essays, scheler 
develops a phenomenological theory of value, of moral experience, which 
can provide us with some important tools to confront the challenges of the 
contemporary world: from the moral and political pluralism  to the relationship 
between ethics and politics, from the question of foundation of normativity to 
the problem of education, helping us to think about the relationship between 
the person and the moral and political world in concrete but rigorous terms.
formalism is divided into two major parts: the first one proposes a theory of 
value as a basis for ethics, the Second tries to define the person by proposing 
a theory of personal identity based on the theory and epistemology of values 
of the first part.
in the first part scheler criticizes, as Kant does, utilitarianism but he also 
rejects Kant’s formalism and apriorism: ethics, according to scheler, is 
based on values,  which can be distinguished in sensory values, vital values, 
personal values and values of the holy. ‘Value’ is a key word in scheler’s 
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thought, it indicates the dimension of the things that makes them important 
to our lives, incarnations of an infinite variety of qualities, characterized by 
specific traits: polarity (values  are always positive or negative), comparative 
degree (each value is inscribed in a network of relationships of inferiority/
superiority), simplicity and irreducibility to goods (or evils) that support them. 
Scheler’s phenomenological approach to values  opens up a huge field of 
research on the dimension of the qualifying power of language − the field of 
the adjectives, for example – on the effect that things have on us, the source 
of each moral assertion or judgment.
scheler’s theory of values aims at exploring the axiological dimension both 
from a formal − what are values, how they relate to each other, which kind 
of relationship they have with the things that embody them, what is the 
relationship between values  and the moral good and evil −, and a material 
point of view − which are the levels of values and how they interact with 
each other, also in terms of social and historical dynamics. it’s important to 
emphasize that scheler’s theory, while supporting the objectivity of value 
judgments, has nothing to do with forms of metaphysical dogmatism. Values 
do not overcome concrete human lives and society: they are discovered 
and known through encounters between people and between people and 
things. Values are not only a matter of individual feeling: they draw eidetic 
connections, they are placed in something like an objective order, because 
the truth (or falsehood) of the axiological configurations is not weakened, 
according to scheler’s perspective, by the fact that under certain cultural, 
social or historical conditions, it is not possible to realize that truth. Values  
are real – they are not mere projections − but individuals never have 
complete knowledge and cognition of them: they always see only some 
aspects, some parts, certain layers but never all. doing so scheler’s theory 
tries to save itself both from ethical relativism and absolutism.
one of the most important scheler’s theoretical achievements is that 
he has clarified the question of justification or epistemology of value 
judgment: it is only through feeling, according to scheler, that we can 
have access to axiological qualities. Feeling plays for the value judgments 
the same role that the external perception plays for statements of fact: 
the role of justification (it provides reason to recognize them as true). in 
this sense, scheler’s theory takes distance, for example, from the British 
sentimentalism: value judgments have truth conditions, they cannot 
be reduced to mere subjective emotional reactions. scheler refuses the 
opposition between rationality and emotional life: the emotional sensitivity 
has its own ‘seriousness’, its own laws, its a priori structures, which can be 
described, analyzed. in formalism we can find a rehabilitation of emotions, 
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the assertion of equal dignity and autonomy of the emotional approach to 
the world: the organ of the emotional life − the feeling − refers to a specific 
level of reality and grasps it with its own proper laws.
at the centre of phenomenological ethics there is the relationship between 
‘right’ (richtig) and ‘just’ (gerecht): the relationship between truth and moral 
adequacy, between logic and ethics7. Perception (adequate or inadequate) 
and preferences of value are the basis of any search for truth and every 
search for moral goodness: there can be no moral life if not through the 
direct exposure, the perceptual experience of values. The major scheler’s 
attempt − parallel to Husserl’s one − is indeed to extend the search for 
knowledge, for truth, even to the field of the personal and moral life. 
shedding light on the issue of emotional life, bringing a little bit of accuracy 
where the tradition saw only subjective tendencies and impulses: in the so-
called ‘chaos’ of emotions, into the disorders of the heart. Taking the moral 
experience seriously means, in short, thinking of it as a form of authentic 
knowledge, which has to do with reality, with ‘eidetic givenness’, with parts 
of the world that are discovered and explored in a never-ending process.
But formalism is not just a theory and epistemology of value judgment. The 
subtitle − a new attempt Toward the foundation of an ethical Personalism − makes 
that clear. scheler wants to do something more ambitious: he wants to 
draw a ‘personology’, a new theory of the person, very different from the 
catholic Personalism (mounier 1949, maritain 1947), a truly philosophical 
theory, not a confessional or ideological one. scheler also rejects the Kantian 
concept of “ person-of-reason”, because that concept ultimately reduces 
the person to mere reason activity, to a mere will conforming to the moral 
law. it is important, from his perspective, to save the human being from the 
philosophical moves that make him anonymous, indistinguishable, which 
reduce his essential reality only to some parts of him, like reason or will. a 
good ethical theory must be able to comprehend the level of individuality: 
the level which includes, for example, the lucky encounters with a person 
or a work of art, the field of the discoveries of our own vocation, of our 
attempts to understand and conquer our own place in the world. Scheler’s 
theory of the person wants to be, indeed, a theory of individuality and 
personal identity, which is also a very useful tool for observing the 
contemporary reality, to reflect on pluralism and cultural differences, 
to glimpse how to reconcile the respect for the fundamental rights with 
the right of uniqueness, of cultural and spiritual specificity. Because it 
is definitely a good thing that there are many orders of priority − many 
7  see also: r. de monticelli, Esercizi di pensiero per apprendisti filosofi, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 
2006.
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conceptions of the good − but these differences have to live together and 
interact with each other. 
From where do we have to start to establish a good theory on tolerance? How 
can we reconcile ethics with many possible ethe, the universal demand of 
good for everyone with the respect for everyone’s vocation? Perhaps from 
scheler’s pages it is possible to start thinking about a new kind of liberalism, a 
‘vocational liberalism’, different from traditional forms8. a liberalism which 
is able to draw a solid foundation for human rights, while keeping alive the 
sense of everyone’s different destination (Bestimmung), the fact that every 
person feels herself called to achieve a certain portion of good in the world, 
some values  between those possible. Because people must be thought of in this 
dual node: they belong and must necessarily belong to some context − family, 
community, State − where they should cooperate and respect each other, 
but they remain individuals with their own dreams, their hopes, projects, 
vocations − absolutely individual and unique9. The establishment, the laws 
of every states must guarantee by any mean that everyone can be satisfied 
with his own personal identity, with the relationship between his own ‘inner’, 
emotional-axiological world, and his place in the common world, in the public 
world, in the world of law and legality.
8  see especially, in the italian edition of formalism: ‘la persona nei contesti etici’, pp. 919-1141.
9  see also: r. de monticelli, Sull’idea di rinnovamento, Raffaello Cortina, Milano 2013.
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